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NEW INSIGHTS INTO WILLIAM JAMES’S PERSONAL CRISIS
IN THE EARLY 1870s: PART I. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER
AND THE ORIGIN & NATURE OF THE CRISIS
DAVID E. LEARY

ABSTRACT
This article, the first in a two-part sequence, will cast new light on the wellknown “crisis of William James” by presenting evidence regarding the
previously unrecognized role of Arthur Schopenhauer’s thought in shaping and
intensifying the way in which James experienced this crisis. It will also relate
Schopenhauer’s influence to prior issues that had concerned James, and in an
appendix it will provide an overview of other areas in which Schopenhauer
seems to have influenced James, both during and after his personal crisis. The
second article in this sequence will present evidence in support of the strong
possibility that John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress played a previously
unrecognized role in inspiring James’s means of defense against the frightening
hallucination and panic fear that characterized his crisis. It will also present an
argument regarding the probable influence of his defensive measures upon his
subsequent views on the nature and importance of attention and will in human
life. Along the way, it will identify James’s specific, newly discovered copy of
Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress and the specific, newly discovered Bible
through which he developed familiarity with the scriptural phrases that helped
him get through his ordeal.
THE STATUS QUO AND RECENT DISCOVERIES
Paul J. Croce (2009) has provided a very thorough review of the extensive
literature on “the crisis of William James” as portrayed in James’s classic
passage on “the worst kind of melancholy” in The Varieties of Religious
Experience (1902/1985).1 Croce’s carefully articulated contention is that this
passage presents a “mannered memory” offered by James as a “teachable
moment” within the unfolding argument of his chapter on “The Sick Soul.”
This is an entirely reasonable conclusion, especially given James’s own
comments on stylized memory-reports:
The accounts we give to others of our experiences…we almost
always make both more simple and more interesting than the
truth. We quote what we should have said or done, rather than
what we really said or did; and in the first telling we may be
fully aware of the distinction. But ere long the fiction expels
the reality from memory and reigns in its stead alone. This is
one great source of the fallibility of testimony meant to be
quite honest. Especially where the marvellous is concerned,
the story takes a tilt that way, and the memory follows the
story. (James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 353)
Over the past two decades, scientific research on false testimony has confirmed
James’s remarkable insight regarding the “narrative demands” placed upon
producers of verbal reports. As Jerome Bruner (2002) has illustrated with
examples drawn from law, literature, and life, a considerable amount of
“smoothing” and “filling” takes place as actual events, with all their edges and
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gaps, are converted into more continuous and coherent accounts. This is now a
well-established phenomenon (see, e.g., Loftus et al., 2013, and Schacter, 1995).
Even so, there is good reason – and compelling evidence – to think, as
Croce does, that James’s report is generally truthful if not, in fact, the Holy Grail
of Truth Entire.2 And that could be the end of it, except that there is more to say
about James’s crisis and its resolution, prompted in part by the recent discovery
of books that were in James’s hands just before, and manifestly on his mind
during, his hallucinatory encounter with the greenish-skinned, idiotic youth
whose image prompted James’s panic fear that “That shape am I...if the hour for
it should strike for me as it struck for him” (James, 1902/1985, p. 134).
Although absolute proof is too much to expect, I believe that a very
compelling story can be told (in this article) about how Arthur Schopenhauer’s
works shaped and intensified the way that James experienced his frightful vision
and, furthermore, that the story can be extended (as it will be in Part II of this
two-part sequence) to show how a work of John Bunyan’s – and more
particularly, James’s recently discovered personal copy of The Pilgrim’s
Progress (1678-1684/1869) – could have provided a model that James followed
in his time of “quivering fear” and “horrible dread” (James, 1902/1985, p. 134).
In telling the first part of this story I will connect the issues raised by
Schopenhauer’s works to a larger set of issues that had concerned James for
more than a decade, and (in the next installment) I will show how Bunyan’s
model of defense against the adversary – or more precisely, the model provided
by Christian, Bunyan’s pilgrim – very possibly helped James get through his
moment of crisis and thus served as the kernel that he nurtured into his later
accounts of attention and will, which were so central to his Principles of
Psychology (1890/1981) and so important to his mature philosophical views. I
will also identify the specific, newly discovered Bible (The Holy Bible, 1856)
that prepared James to follow Christian’s example.
DISCOVERIES REGARDING JAMES’S READING OF SCHOPENHAUER
That James read here and there in Arthur Schopenhauer’s works has
always been known. Though he didn’t write much about this reading, James
referred to Schopenhauer from time to time in his letters, lectures, manuscripts,
and published works. Yet, probably because these references were typically
brief, rarely involved sustained analysis, and almost always conveyed a reaction
against Schopenhauer – or more precisely, against an idea, approach, or tone for
which James used Schopenhauer as a mere representative – and also because
James, in later years, expressed disdain for Schopenhauer and his philosophy, no
one has ever made much of James’s relation to Schopenhauer or his thought. In
fact, even Ralph Barton Perry, who went further than anyone else (so far as I
know), devoted only four out of 1,612 pages in his classic Thought and
Character of William James (1935) to James and Schopenhauer, mostly to quote
a long letter from 1883 that clarified what the more mature James didn’t like
about Schopenhauer and his thought (Vol. 1, pp. 721-724).3
Perry did note in passing, however, that James “credited Schopenhauer
with being the first among philosophers to speak ‘the concrete truth about the
ills of life’” (p. 721). That comment bears directly upon the important attraction
that Schopenhauer exercised over James, which in turn signals the critical debate
that James was waging within himself, throughout the 1860s and early 1870s,
regarding the nature of the world, its evils, and the possibility that those evils
could be ameliorated through willful efforts on his part and that of others. As
this article will show, Schopenhauer played a previously unrecognized role in
this inner debate, up to and beyond James’s personal crisis.
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Before surveying some information that has recently come to light, a
review of facts mentioned by Perry (1935) will help to situate the significance of
this new information. First, in 1858, a 16-year-old James brandished a copy of
“a volume of Schopenhauer” and read “amusing specimens of his delightful
pessimism” to his Newport, R.I. friends. Ten years later, in 1868, James bought
his own copy of Schopenhauer’s major work, Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung (3d ed., 1859). Subsequently, in the early 1870s, he made notebook
entries on empiricism and idealism, echoed later in The Principles of Psychology
(1890/1981), that suggest he had been reading Schopenhauer’s Über die
vierfache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde (3d ed., 1864). And in
1873 and 1875 respectively, he wrote another notebook entry and a book review
that dismissed the kind of “pessimism” for which Schopenhauer was widely
known. Finally, in 1877, he was reading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung as
he worked on “The Sentiment of Rationality,” a seminal publication that
included several references to Schopenhauer when it appeared in 1879 (James,
1879/1978c). The only then-known fact not mentioned by Perry, at least as
regards the period that concerns us, is that James cited Schopenhauer in his diary
as one of the authors he read in 1869 and 1870.4
So it isn’t that nothing has been known about James’s various contacts
with Schopenhauer during his formative years; it’s just that little has been made
of those contacts, perhaps because (in addition to the reasons given above)
James was reading so many authors on so many topics during those years
(especially since late 1868, when he purchased Schopenhauer’s magnum opus),
despite his continuing physical and psychological problems.
What has prompted another look at James’s relation to Schopenhauer are
some facts I discovered while going through the library charging ledgers for
both the Harvard College Library and the Boston Athenaeum: James checked
out Schopenhauer’s Parerga und Paralipomena (1851) and Wilhelm Gwinner’s
Schopenhauer aus persönlichem Umgange dargestelt (1862) from the Harvard
College Library on January 31, 1867; he took out Gwinner’s book again from
the same library on December 1, 1869; he withdrew Schopenhauer’s book again,
though this time from the Boston Athenaeum, on December 22, 1869; he
checked out Schopenhauer’s Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (1841) from
the Harvard College Library on January 13, 1870; and finally he took out
another book by Schopenhauer, probably Über die vierfache Wurzel des Satzes
vom zureichenden Grunde (3d ed., 1864), but possibly Parerga und
Paralipomena or Die beiden Grundprobleme der Ethik (the ledger simply
indicates Schopenhauer, not the individual volume) from the Harvard College
Library on March 7, 1870. Meanwhile he was also reading his own personal
copy of Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.5
Clearly, more was going on between James and Schopenhauer than has
been realized by scholars in the past, though there are mitigating circumstances
for this oversight: not only the obscure and unfrequented location of the library
charging records, but more significantly the silence of James himself regarding
his reading of Schopenhauer during this period – a silence that is all the more
intriguing since he was typically open and even eager to discuss what he was
reading, both in his own letters and in conversations with others, which
sometimes led to second-hand reports in their letters. And besides the silence in
his letters and those of others, there is silence in James’s diary, notebooks, and
other documents. True, some pages and other materials from this period have
been destroyed, but those that remain contain nothing about James’s now
apparent extensive reading of Schopenhauer.
It seems reasonable to conjecture that James kept his reading of
Schopenhauer to himself because he didn’t want to explain or defend this
reading to members of his family or to friends who were concerned about his
emotional and intellectual state of mind. (Schopenhauer would not have been
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on anyone’s list of recommended reading for a depressed, sometimes suicidal
young man. As noted in the second installment of this two-part sequence, James
tried to shield his mother, in particular, from awareness of his disturbed state of
mind – unsuccessfully of course.) But whatever the reason for James’s silence,
we shall see clear evidence of the impact of his encounter with Schopenhauer
when we revisit the report of his personal crisis that he published in The
Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985). That evidence is there for all to
see, once the doors of perception are opened. As James himself wrote several
decades later, “the only things which we commonly see are those which we
preperceive, and the only things which we preperceive are those which have
been labeled for us” (James, 1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 420, italics deleted).
Although the signs of Schopenhauer’s thought are clearly embedded in James’s
report, no one has yet labeled their provenance or identified their significance.
Before saying more about this, however, I need to say a few words about
James’s personal crisis.
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF JAMES’S PERSONAL CRISIS
No one is certain about the exact time that James suffered the frightful
apparition and fear reported in The Varieties of Religious Experience, though the
strong consensus, as Croce (2009) has indicated, is sometime in 1870 or
thereabouts, most probably in the winter of 1870, but possibly a bit later. In
fact, it could well have been associated with that “great dorsal collapse” that
James dated “around the 10th or 12[th]” of January, 1870, especially since this
physical collapse was accompanied, he said, by “a moral one” that left him
questioning what he called “the moral business” (James, 1868-1873, entry for
February 1, 1870).6 For although a full accounting of James’s personal crisis
would involve extended discussions of his ongoing poor health, frequent
depression, occasional suicidal impulses, prolonged career indecision, the
declining health and then death of his beloved cousin Minny Temple, and other
issues, the core of his crisis – as reported explicitly in The Varieties of Religious
Experience – was a very specific fear: not a fear of continuing depression, or
indecisiveness about his career, or the potential or actual loss of a loved one, or
anything else other than the fear that if fate so determined – if the impersonal
laws of physical and physiological causation just happened to work out that way
– he would go insane just as pitifully and unavoidably as the idiotic youth of his
frightful vision.7
What grabbed James by the throat and shook him to his innermost being
was thus a consequence of a more fundamental fear that “we are nature through
and through” and, hence, if his time to go insane were to come, there would be
absolutely nothing he could do about it. So, while insanity was the immediate
object of his fear during his moment of crisis, it was the more general possibility
of being at the complete, passive mercy of causal forces that lent such shattering
force to his experience, making him panic like a non-swimmer in a sinking life
raft in the middle of an ocean. His raft until then had been buoyed, if barely, by
a desperate patchwork of hopes regarding “the moral business” mentioned
above, held together by a cluster of ideas related to a deep longing to believe in
free will and a passionate desire to make a difference in the world, both through
opposing the evils he perceived and through his collaborative fellowship with
others.8
James had struggled with these hopes and associated fears as well as with
his too-tentative belief in free will for a good many years, but a death spiral of
concerns and apprehensions seems to have come to a head in January, 1870.
Even after February 1, when he guessed that he had “about touched bottom,” he
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continued to struggle until, understandably, he seems to have hit a new bottom
when he learned, a day after the fact, that Minny Temple had died on March 8.
In any case, James’s response to his cousin’s death, exacerbated by the intimate
communications the two had shared in the months before her death, led to the
often cited turning-point of April 29, 1870, when James was moved by his
reading of Charles Renouvier’s second Essai de critique générale (1859) to
choose to believe in free will: As he famously wrote in his diary, “My first act
of free will shall be to believe in free will” (James, 1868-1873). Although this
significant moment plays a pivotal role in all of his biographies, it is clear that
James wasn’t able to follow his intentions as consistently as he had hoped; his
willful conviction about free will wavered over the next few years. Even though
he moved forward (and upward) in general, the road he trod was rough and
uneven.9 So, whether or not the incident reported in Varieties took place at some
point between mid-January and late April, 1870, as seems highly probable (and
all the more so in light of what follows in this article), James continued to
struggle, most commentators agree, until he reached higher ground and stayed
there for the most part, following his marriage to Alice Howe Gibbens on July
10, 1878. By that time he had established himself at Harvard, delivered
important lecture series in Baltimore and Boston, and begun writing the first
articles that would lead, over a long twelve years, to the publication of his
Principles of Psychology (1890/1981).
Now it is time to tell the story that emerges from my recent discoveries
about the extent and timing of James’s reading of Schopenhauer.
JAMES’S CRISIS IN LIGHT OF HIS READING OF SCHOPENHAUER
Here are some selected portions of the classic account that James gave of
his personal crisis in The Varieties of Religious Experience:
Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general
depression of spirits about my prospects...suddenly there fell
upon me...a horrible fear of my own existence.
Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an
epileptic patient...with greenish skin, entirely idiotic....This
image and my fear entered into a species of combination with
each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially. Nothing that
I possess can defend me against that fate, if the hour for it
should strike for me as it struck for him. There was such a
horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely
momentary discrepancy from him, that…I became a mass of
quivering fear. After this the universe was changed for me
altogether. I awoke morning after morning with a horrible
dread at the pit of my stomach, and with a sense of the
insecurity of life that I never knew before, and that I have
never felt since. It was like a revelation; and...the experience
has made me sympathetic with the morbid feelings of others
ever since. (James, 1902/1985, pp. 134-135, none of the bold
print and only the italics for “That shape am I” are in the
original)
The instantly striking thing in this account is that James identifies his preceding
state not simply as one of “pessimism” but as one of “philosophic pessimism,”
which is in itself a clear reference to Schopenhauer, whose thought was
commonly discussed under this banner. Then comes the jarring “horrible fear of
my own existence.” Why fear one’s own existence? Did James fear what it
means to be human – his being subject to the human condition? Or did his fear
William James Studies: Vol. 11
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perhaps involve a concern for his own existence, at least as he would like to
conceive it? The key to interpreting this vaguely articulated fear revolves
around the central thought in James’s entire report: “That shape am I, I felt,
potentially.” James’s fear was that he could be the same as him – that his
“discrepancy” from the idiotic, epileptic patient was “merely momentary,” a
contingent matter of “fate.” And this devastating thought changed not just his
perception of himself but his perception of the entire universe. It was “like a
revelation,” like the kind of life-changing realizations that Tolstoy, Bunyan, and
others had, as James had been discussing just prior to his self-report in Varieties.
And among the fruits of his horrific experience, James said, was a newfound
“sympathy” – literally, a feeling at one – with others.
The central key or fulcrum in James’s report, as already noted, was his fear
that “That shape am I...potentially,” and this statement – even more than his
general reference to “philosophic pessimism” – brings us to Schopenhauer’s
very specific influence upon the form and intensity of James’s frightful
experience. For the critical thrust of Schopenhauer’s thought – the contention
around which his works revolve – is that the principium individuationis (the
principle of individuation) is false and that individuality is, therefore, an illusion.
Or, stated in the terminology Schopenhauer borrowed from ancient Indian
thought, the experience of individuality and the associated belief in the
indeterminacy of individual will are chimeras resulting from seeing one’s self
and the world through “the veil of Maya,” which is to say, from seeing them as
they are represented in the dream-like phenomenal world of mere appearances.
True enlightenment – and true freedom – come from ripping that veil asunder
and ridding ourselves of the illusions (or more precisely, the delusions) resulting
from unexamined human experience. We must get beyond self-encapsulated
“egotism” by realizing the wisdom in the Mahavakya (the Grand Word or
Pronouncement) of the Chandogya Upanishad, “Tat twam asi.” Schopenhauer
never tired of repeating this Sanskrit phrase along with its German translation as
“Dies bis du” which equates to the English “This art thou.” In this simple
formulation of the fundamental doctrine of Hinduism, shared by some forms of
Buddhism and adopted by Schopenhauer as a succinct and accurate expression
of the conclusion – and moral foundation – of his own systematic thought,
“This” stands for Ultimate Reality, Brahman, or, in Schopenhauer’s
conceptualization, Will, and “thou” stands for each and every living creature in
the universe. Thus, each and every living creature is understood to be a
representation of the very same underlying nature, and their mutual
identification with that singular nature renders each identical to every other.
Any sense of individuality is simply a trick of phenomenal experience – an
“illusion” – on this side of “the veil of Maya.”10
Here is the crucial point: This defining statement – “Tat twam asi” or
“This art thou” – captures precisely what James suddenly felt and expressed in
only slightly different words: “That shape am I,” at least potentially. And all
the “dread” and “insecurity” that he felt during his revelatory experience was
apparently – from his own description – the result of his being overwhelmed by
the thought that this could be true, that only contingent considerations had
created and preserved his phenomenal sense of “discrepancy” from others: a
sense that was crucial for “the moral business” (involving free will, individual
effort, and personal contributions) that meant so much to him.
Thus, as indicated, the internal evidence within James’s report, by itself,
provides prima facie reason to accept a Schopenhauerian interpretation of
James’s personal crisis, but additional weight as well as suggestive evidence
regarding the dating of James’s personal crisis can be gained through an
examination of some of his diary entries between 1870 and 1873 (in James,
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1868-1873). As already mentioned, James’s entry for February 1, 1870 – the
one in which he noted that he had “about touched bottom” – raised the issue of
“the moral business.” He had come to perceive, he wrote, “that I must face the
choice with open eyes: shall I frankly throw the moral business overboard, as
one unsuited to my innate aptitude, or shall I follow it, and it alone, making
everything else merely stuff for it? – I will give the latter alternative a fair trial.
Who knows but the moral interest may become developed.” Clearly, he was
having trouble convincing himself that he could be successful in cultivating
what he called his “moral interest,” which ultimately concerned (he said) getting
“my moral life to become active,” so that – as he had previously put it – “I might
make my nick, however small a one in the raw stuff the race has got to shape”
(James, 1868/1995b, p. 250). But as relevant as this entry may be for
understanding James’s general frame of mind, it also reveals that what he was
questioning was his individual ability to follow through on something that he
chose to do; in short, he was not (yet) questioning his individuality or even, at
the moment, the potential efficacy of his will.
But in his next diary entry on March 22, 1870, written two weeks after
Minny Temple’s death, a very significant shift has taken place. In this heartwrenching entry, addressed to Minny, James wrote:
By that big part of me that’s in the tomb with you, may I
realize and believe in the immediacy of death! May I feel that
every torment suffered here passes and is as a breath of wind –
every pleasure too. Acts & examples stay. Time is long. One
human life is an instant….Minny, your death makes me feel
the nothingness of all our egotistic fury. The inevitable
release is sure; wherefore take our turn kindly whatever it
contain. Ascend to some sort of partnership with fate, & since
tragedy is at the heart of us, go to meet it, work it to our ends,
instead of dodging it all our days, and being run down by it at
last. Use your death (or your life, it’s all one meaning) tat
twam asi. (James, 1868-1873)
Note that James started this entry by expressing his identification with Minny.11
A big part of him is in the tomb with her. Their individuality – their seeming
difference – even his being alive and her being dead – is no longer relevant.
They are one, and all petty egotism, at least for the moment, has come to
nothing. We need to submit to fate, he says, recognizing the tragedy of human
life and accepting that death and life are ultimately the same. All of this – the
very wording as well as the sentiments expressed – smacks loudly of
Schopenhauer, but the ultimate corroboration of the Schopenhauerian
connection is the “tat twam asi” that concludes this diary entry. It provides a
clear and evident link between Schopenhauer’s thought, this diary entry, and
James’s later account of his personal crisis in The Varieties of Religious
Experience.12
A little over a month later, on April 30, in the diary entry that reports
James’s decision to follow Renouvier’s lead and believe in free will (an entry
that thus underscores that he had been doubting the existence of free will in a
way that he hadn’t admitted on February 1), James makes the telling comment
that he sees no reason why the belief in free will, which after all was a belief in
the efficacy of his own individuality, “need be the definition of an illusion.” In
fact, he wrote, “I will assume for the present – until next year – that it is no
illusion.” These hedged assertions (that belief in one’s ability to act on one’s
own initiative need not be an illusion, and that one can at least provisionally
assume that it is not) seem clearly to allude to Schopenhauer’s argument that
belief in individuality and in the indeterminacy of human will is not just wrong,
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but is an “illusion” created by the veil (or dream) of Maya. In addition, James’s
vow in this entry to “abstain from the mere speculation & contemplative
Grübelei [musings] in which my nature takes most delight, and voluntarily [to]
cultivate the feeling of moral freedom, by reading books favorable to it, as well
as by acting” (italics added), is entirely consistent with the contention that James
was now reacting against the kinds of reflection and reading that seem to have
precipitated his moment of crisis. This suggests that James’s personal crisis,
with its apparent Schopenhauer-inspired fears, had already taken place, and
that James was now attempting to move beyond it by implementing a twofold
strategy of (1) believing and acting as if he were in control of his life and (2)
avoiding the kinds of ideas and written materials that could cast doubt upon this
working premise.13
Eventually, James noted in the same entry, he might “return to metaphysic
study & skepticism without danger to my powers of action,” but for now, he
pledged to avoid such study and skepticism – and by implication, to avoid
Schopenhauer. Then, expanding upon his earlier statement, James proclaimed
that he would go “a step further” than simply believing in his own individual
will; he would “believe in my individual reality and creative power,” precisely
the things that Schopenhauer would have prompted him to doubt. (In fact, it is
only in the context of Schopenhauer’s thought that it makes sense for James to
add this affirmation of “individual reality and creative power” to his already
stated affirmation of the efficacy of his will.) Yet even here James offered a
qualification: “My belief to be sure can’t be optimistic – but I will posit life,
(the real, the good) in the self governing resistance of the ego to the world.”
With this final proposition, James had completed his turn-around: Instead of
envisioning the universe pressing down and threatening to absorb him against
his will and against any other power at his disposal, as he had, so frighteningly,
during his personal crisis, he now took his stand by asserting the reality of his
ego and positing that its “self governance” consisted in the ability to push back
and resist the way of the world. However tentatively, he was back into “the
moral business.”
It is possible that James went on in his diary to comment more explicitly
about his rejection of Schopenhauer’s thought, but this is precisely the point at
which he (or someone else) ripped some pages out of his diary, including the
lower half of the page from which I have been quoting. That truncated entry
now ends with a line that has been made out to read “Life shall be built doing &
suffering & creating….”
Three years passed before James made another extant diary entry. It is a
short entry, written on February 10, 1873, that reported his decision “to stick to
biology as a profession” even though he would continue to regard philosophy as
his “vocation.” Just over a month later, on March 18, James’s father wrote to
his brother Henry that “Willy” was (finally!) going along “swimmingly” and
that he, William, had reported that “my mind [is] so cleared up and restored to
sanity. It is the difference between death and life.” Death and life were no
longer the same! One reason for his recovery, William said, was the positive
reading he was doing (the kind of reading he had vowed to do back on April 30,
1870), especially works by Renouvier and Wordsworth. But the primary reason
that William gave, his father wrote, was “his having given up the notion that all
mental disorder required to have a physical basis,” which was a point that
Schopenhauer (along with others) had argued and that James had specifically
feared during his moment of crisis (letter quoted in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 339340).14
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That James hadn’t entirely escaped Schopenhauer, despite his apparent
improvement, was manifest on April 10, 1873, in the second diary entry that he
wrote after that three-year gap:
Philosophical activity as a business is not normal for most
men, and not for me….I fear the constant sense of instability
generated by this attitude [i.e., the critical and skeptical
attitude appropriate to philosophical inquiry] wd. be more than
the voluntary faith I can keep going is sufficient to neutralize –
and that the dream-conception, ‘Maya,’ the abyss of horrors,
would ’spite of everything grasp my imagination and imperil
my reason.
This passage harkens back to James’s encounter with Schopenhauer and the
concept of “Maya,” which apparently still posed a threat to his imagination and
sanity. For a budding naturalist and empiricist, the specter that phenomenal
experience, including the experience of individual differences, might be illusory
was understandably disturbing. Clearly, James had not yet fully exorcised the
earlier impact of Schopenhauer.
Two years later, in October 1875, James again looked back on his personal
crisis, this time in a more distanced and objective way. He did so in a review of
“German Pessimism,” which provides virtually conclusive support for the
argument I have been making about the significance of Schopenhauer’s thought
in shaping and intensifying his crisis. In this review, after admitting that
Schopenhauer was “assuredly one of the greatest of writers,” James
cautioned that “when he [Schopenhauer] morbidly reiterates the mystic
Sanskrit motto, Tat twam asi – This [maniac or cripple] art thou – as the
truth of truths, he will of course exert a spell over persons in the
unwholesome sentimental moulting-time of youth” (James 1875/1987b, p.
312, bold print added). Take special note that the bracketed “maniac or cripple”
was inserted into the middle of James’s translation of Tat twam asi (“This art
thou”) by James himself; it is not a later or editorial emendation. Read this
quotation again! I don’t know how much closer we could ever hope to come
(short of an out-and-out admission by James) to proving that in his own
“unwholesome sentimental moulting-time” he had fallen under Schopenhauer’s
spell, thus allowing his memory of an idiotic (“maniacal”) and epileptic
(“crippled”) patient to enter into “a species of combination,” as he put it in The
Varieties of Religious Experience, with the fears prompted by Schopenhauer’s
denial of the reality of individual differences, thus leading to the horrific thought
– “That shape am I…potentially” – that stood at the center of the experience we
have come to know as “the personal crisis of William James.”
Although I believe that I have now provided more than sufficient evidence
to support the central thesis of this article, there is yet another piece of evidence
that I would like to share. It comes from James’s posthumously published Some
Problems of Philosophy (1911/1979c). In this work, the first substantive
problem that James addressed, after making some preliminary comments on
metaphysics in general, was “The Problem of Being.” Not by chance, we might
now assume, James began his discussion with a long quotation from
Schopenhauer, noting that “Schopenhauer’s remarks on this question may be
considered classical” (p. 26). And after providing the quotation, which he took
from Schopenhauer’s chapter “On the Metaphysical Need of Man” (this is
James’s translation of the chapter’s German title, “Ueber das metaphysiche
Bedürfniss des Menchen”), James went on to write that “one need only shut
oneself in a closet and begin to think of the fact of one’s being there, of one’s
queer bodily shape in the darkness (a thing to make children scream at, as
Stevenson says), of one’s fantastic character and all, to have wonder steal over
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the detail as much as [over] the general fact of being” (pp. 26-27). A sense of
wonder at one’s “queer bodily shape”? while “in a closet”? and “in the
darkness”? I assume you have already noted the similarity between “one’s
queer bodily shape” and “That [terrible] shape am I,” but what about one’s
being “in a closet” and “in the darkness”? In quoting from James’s account of
his personal crisis in Varieties, earlier in this article, I omitted a clause – not
needed at the time – that is relevant in the context of this later statement.
According to his full account, James’s personal crisis occurred, not only while
he was in a “state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits
about my prospects,” but also when he “went one evening into a dressing-room
in the twilight to procure some article that was there” (James, 1902/1985, p.
134). The parallel between being “in the darkness” and going into an enclosed
room at “twilight” is obvious, and the interchangeable use of the words
“dressing-room” and “closet” in those days is widely known. (In fact, the term
for dressing-room in French, the supposed original language of James’s report,
is cabinet [closet] de toilette.) Although James reported “wonder” rather than
“panic fear” as the typical metaphysical state of mind, the general parallel
between the occasion of his personal crisis and his prescription for getting in
touch with the problem of being seems more than coincidental. Indeed, it is
relevant to add that Schopenhauer’s comments on the problem of being include
the observation that metaphysical “wonder” passes into “unrest” at “the thought
[that] the non-existence of the world [and hence of one’s own individual being]
is just as possible as its existence,” and that “wonder” then passes beyond
“unrest” into “brooding” over the possible “fatality” that could produce a world
that is “hostile to our own interests.” Philosophy thus begins, Schopenhauer
says, in “a minor chord” (as translated and quoted by James, 1911/1979c, p. 26).
Doesn’t this seem more than a mere echo of James’s own journey through a
moment of crisis to a life of philosophical reflection?
CONCLUSION
I said earlier that the dating of James’s personal crisis cannot be
determined with absolute certainty, but the sequence of events I have surveyed
in this article suggests very strongly that his crisis took place between Minny
Temple’s death on March 8, 1870, and James’s declaration of free will on April
30 of that same year.15 But whenever it happened, I think I have shown beyond
any reasonable doubt that it assumed its unique form and intensity due to
James’s reading of Schopenhauer.
One might nonetheless ask if the account given in this article isn’t perhaps
“more simple and more interesting than the truth,” as later accounts tend to be
according to James (1890/1981, Vol. 1, p. 353). In response, all I can do is
admit that James’s lived experience was inevitably more complicated than any
of us – even James himself – could describe. One doesn’t need to be a Freudian
to believe that history and individual lives as well as cognitive and emotional
processes are all overdetermined. One thing that has been omitted from this
account, for instance, is James’s contemporaneous delving into his father’s
views on evil and selfhood. Another is James’s earlier reading of the Stoics,
especially Marcus Aurelius. Though formulated within very different
intellectual frameworks, Henry James, Sr.’s arguments and Marcus Aurelius’s
aphorisms were in their own ways as challenging as Schopenhauer’s – and not
so different in their implications as one might think. And it is important to note
that James’s fear of “fate” took its initial shape from his concern about scientific
determinism, which was on his mind before – and after – Schopenhauer’s
philosophical determinism and ontological reductionism seem so obviously to

William James Studies: Vol. 11

	
  

NEW INSIGHTS: PART I

11

	
  
have had their sway.16 But even though nothing complicated ever happens along
simple direct lines alone, that doesn’t mean that there aren’t some relatively
simple, direct lines within the tangle of aspects from which historical and
personal events can be viewed. This article has laid out an argument and
evidence regarding one such line that has not previously been noted. To the
extent that it has been successful, it should have enriched our understanding of
the origin and nature of James’s personal crisis.17
University Professor
University of Richmond
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APPENDIX ON SCHOPENHAUER AND JAMES
Every student of philosophy is familiar with Schopenhauer’s name, and
many know that Schopenhauer influenced Nietzsche. Far fewer realize that
Schopenhauer also touched the lives and thought of Wagner, von Hartmann,
Turgenev, Renan, Tolstoy, Mahler, Wundt, Durkheim, Hardy, Freud, Vaihinger,
Conrad, Proust, Zola, Bergson, Maupassant, Strauss, Mann, Einstein, Jung,
Lawrence, Thomas, Beckett, and Borges in significant ways, or that both
Wittgenstein and Popper acknowledged being drawn to philosophy by their
early contact with Schopenhauer’s work. And even the rare student who has a
sense of Schopenhauer’s significance in the history of Western thought is
unlikely to have read more than a snippet of his work, if that. For generations,
Schopenhauer seemed formidable, forbidding…and unnecessary to read.
This is changing, slowly but surely, as more attention is directed to
Schopenhauer, largely (in the English speaking world) because of the scholarly
efforts of Patrick Gardiner (1963), Bryan Magee (1997b), David Cartwright
(2010), and others. A recent work by Frederick C. Beiser (2014) should add
significantly to this change. (Much that he says is relevant to understanding
Schopenhauer’s impact on James.) Yet even as this occurs, it will surprise many
to learn that James’s older and more conservative colleague, Francis Bowen,
taught a popular course on Schopenhauer (among other figures) for years and
years at Harvard; that Josiah Royce, James’s close intellectual colleague, was
steeped in Schopenhauer’s thought and credited it with launching and guiding
important aspects of his own notable work in psychology as well as philosophy;
that Charles Renouvier, that great patron of free will, took Schopenhauer very
seriously, if also critically; and that Max Horkheimer argued that Schopenhauer
was ahead of his time: that in the broken world of post-World War II,
Schopenhauer’s vision no longer seems so negative or pessimistic, but rather
honest, bracing…and necessary.
In this context it won’t seem so surprising that James may have taken more
than we have realized from this post-Kantian titan, who did philosophy and the
world the favor of following his fundamental insight, unblinkingly, as far as it
would lead. He may well have been wrong about many things – let’s simply
assert that he was – but he did precisely what James himself argued a
philosopher should do, perhaps with Schopenhauer in mind: He offered an
alternative perspective on the world for us to consider (James, 1867/1978a).
(James may have come to his perspectivism, at least in this regard, through
considering Schopenhauer’s claim that “philosophy can never do more than
interpret and explain what is present and at hand….It does this, however, in
every possible relation and connexion and from every point of view”
[Schopenhauer, 1859/1966, Vol. 1, p. 271].) As Magee (1997a) has written,
there is real value in a philosopher offering a vision that is “illuminating” even if
it does not represent “literal truth.” Advancing the same point that James was
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making, though without any apparent awareness of that fact, Magee has argued
for the importance of philosophers who “throw light” on issues from a
“distinctive angle,” thus enriching “our view of the way things are” (p. 401).
This is tantamount to saying that Schopenhauer did what the best artists do,
which is doubly apt since he is acknowledged to be one of the finest
philosophers of the arts. (On the importance of “perspective” in “the art of
human understanding” according to James, see Leary, 1992.)
So, if James was in fact influenced by Schopenhauer more than we have
realized (and it wouldn’t take much to reach this criterion), let’s not assume that
this is somehow unusual or even shocking. Anyone who chooses to investigate
the connection between James and Schopenhauer should keep an open mind
about the possible outcome, as Schopenhauer himself – yes, and James too –
would have done if they were in our place.
This is not the time for an extensive, much less exhaustive treatment of the
relationship between Schopenhauer and James. (In any case, I am not capable
of providing one at this point in time.) But a few words about James’s relation
to Schopenhauer in the years after 1875 and a few hints about possible areas of
influence seem in order. Hopefully, they will provide some initial guidance for
scholars who may wish to look more closely into the connection between
Schopenhauer and James. Whatever “loathing” James may have felt for
Schopenhauer’s tone and attitude (see Note #3), he seems to have been inspired
by Schopenhauer’s honesty about the evils of the world, by his criticism of the
stagnant habits of the philosophical community, by his clear and sprightly
writing (including his frequent and effective use of clinching metaphors), and by
his careful and unfettered analysis of previous human thought, including Kant’s
first Critique, which formed the root of Schopenhauer’s own work. Getting
other thinkers right was always a concern – a matter of justice as well as utility –
for both Schopenhauer and James.
The first tangible example of Schopenhauer’s influence on James became
apparent in 1877 as he worked on publications that appeared in 1878 and 1879.
I mentioned in the text that James took out Wilhelm Gwinner’s Schopenhauer
aus persönlichem Umgange dargestelt (1862) several times during the late
1860s. Gwinner’s book focused on Schopenhauer’s life and character as well as
his system of thought. James’s repeated return to this book indicates an early
interest in the relation between the philosopher’s character or temperament, on
the one hand, and his way of thinking, on the other, an interest that was
generalized in James’s “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879/1978c), which
made pertinent references to Schopenhauer (1859) and led to James’s later
distinction between the philosophical tendencies of “the tender-minded” and
those of “the tough-minded” (James, 1907/1975a) and to his claim that “a
philosophy is the expression of a man’s intimate character, and all definitions of
the universe are but the deliberately adopted reactions of human characters upon
it” (James, 1909/1977, p. 14). All three works reflect James’s underlying
interest in the psychology of philosophers, or more precisely, “The Psychology
of Philosophizing,” which he had tentatively considered as a title for “The
Sentiment of Rationality” (James, ca. 1877/1978d, p. 359). His views on this
topic, underlying his defense of “the subjective method” (e.g., James,
1878/1978b), were thus almost certainly influenced by his reflections on
Schopenhauer – and more than that, they were probably influenced by
Schopenhauer’s own reflections “On the Metaphysical Need of Man”
(Schopenhauer, 1859, Vol. 2, Ch. 17), which James made a special note of
having read in late 1869 (James, 1868-1873). His annotated copy of
Schopenhauer’s (1859) masterpiece confirms the care that he took in this
reading.
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Schopenhauer also seems to have made a deep impression upon James
through his discussion of moral principles. This was first apparent in James’s
initial article (1875/1987a) on the vivisection controversy of the mid-1870s, in
which he expressed respect but also some reservation regarding an unbending
application of the Buddhist principle neminem laede (“injure no one”). This
way of stating the principle, in Latin, clearly comes from Schopenhauer, who
frequently invoked this formulation in his works (e.g., Schopenhauer,
1841/2009, p. 140). (The full principle, in Latin, is neminem laede, imo omnes,
quantum potes, juva, i.e., “injure no one; instead, help everyone as much as you
can.”) The final proof that this is so comes from the fact that, when James
(1879-1885/1988) cited this principle in his later lectures, he gave Schopenhauer
credit for it (p. 175).
In various ways this principle is deeply consonant with “the moral
business” to which James had dedicated his life. In fact, it seems eventually to
blend for him, as it did from the start for Schopenhauer, into a far-reaching view
of how we should understand and approach one another. Toward the end of the
century, James wrote “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings” (1899/1983),
which he considered his most important essay since it reveals “the perception on
which my whole individualistic philosophy is based” (James, 1899/2000, p.
522). In this essay, undercutting later criticisms (based on misunderstanding) of
his individualism, he argued that his individualistic philosophy is founded upon
the perception that each and every individual – not just “I” or a limited group of
“we” – is to be treated with the same respect and accorded the same dignity
because of the underlying humanity shared by all. This essay, which has been
called the first modern manifesto for multiculturalism (Sollors, 1996), is both
pluralistic in its emphasis on variation and difference, and monistic in its
emphasis upon equal rights and mutual dependency. In defense of a theme that
James expressed in various ways in multiple writings (e.g., that each of us
contributes a different syllable to the common message of human experience),
James argued that every person enjoys “a partial superiority of insight from the
peculiar position in which he stands” (1899/1983, p. 149). He spelled out the
implications of this view in subsequent works (e.g., James, 1907/1975b &
1909/1975c), and the same attitude suffused his notion that the community –
ultimately the world-wide community – is the operative agent for the
advancement of knowledge, ideals, values, and behavior. This is not an exact
replication of Schopenhauer’s views, but it suggests that James eventually came
to see the identification of individuals with each other, which caused him such
anxiety in the early 1870s, in a more positive light. By then, sympathy and
compassion, Schopenhauer’s key moral virtues, had become fundamental to his
own ethical and social thought.
James also came to have a more positive view of Hindu thought and of Tat
twam asi in particular, as seen in the mysticism chapter of The Varieties of
Religious Experience, where he wrote:
This overcoming of all the usual barriers between the
individual and the Absolute is the great mystic achievement.
In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and we
become aware of our oneness. This is the everlasting and
triumphant mystical tradition….‘That art thou!’ [Tat twam asi]
say the Upanishads, and the Vedantists add: ‘Not a part, not a
mode of That, but identically That, that absolute Spirit of the
World.’ (James, 1902/1985, p. 332)
That James now saw what had previously scared him as a positive thing, as
the essential “mystical truth” (p. 333), is demonstrated by the entire context in
which he wrote this passage. Like “such self-contradictory phrases as ‘dazzling
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obscurity,’” he now regarded talk about melding many into one as being closer
to “music” than “conceptual speech” (p. 333). Schopenhauer, the great advocate
of music, would have understood and appreciated this statement, which
underscores a point made above, about the artistic rather than literal significance
of Schopenhauer’s thought. Such music gives us a way of comprehending our
common, shared humanity, warts and all. And that comprehension led James to
the implicit poly- or pantheism, mentioned earlier, that held humans responsible
for assisting in the creation of a more ideal world (see James, 1882/1997a, p.
195; 1902/1985, p. 413; & 1907/1975b, pp. 131-144). In this way and others,
Schopenhauer seems to have provided a stimulus that eventually sensitized
James to the claims, rights, and significance of “the other.”
Of course, Schopenhauer also provided ideas that James pushed against,
which surely constituted as important – sometimes a greater – influence than
ideas he agreed with. For instance, in understanding and then opposing both
naïve optimism and rebarbative pessimism, the latter being represented by
Schopenhauer, James came to his own middle position of meliorism, which
treats “salvation” as neither inevitable (as optimism does) nor impossible (as
pessimism does) but as possible; and from early on, possibility was a word that
opened up for James a vibrant, challenging, and ultimately invigorating world of
risk and opportunity (see James, 1875/1987b, p. 313, & 1907/1975b). In a
closely related matter, Schopenhauer served as an unacknowledged but apparent
interlocutor regarding a question that Schopenhauer was famous for prompting
many others to consider, namely, Is life worth living? (On Schopenhauer’s role
in “the pessimism controversy” of the late nineteenth century, see Beiser, 2014,
Ch. 5.) James addressed this issue squarely in an 1895 address to members of
Harvard’s YMCA, which was later included in The Will to Believe and Other
Essays in Popular Philosophy (James, 1895/1897b). In this address he spoke of
pessimism as “essentially a religious disease” (p. 40) and underscored its
“nightmare view of life” (p. 41), specifically relating it to “that metaphysical
tedium vitae which is peculiar to reflecting men” (39) and to the “suicidal
mood” (p. 52) associated with it. In the end, he exhorted his young listeners to
“Be not afraid of life. Believe that life is worth living, and your belief will help
create the fact” (p. 56). This advice foreshadowed not only his subsequent
address on “The Will to Believe” (James, 1896/1897a) but also the conclusion
of The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985), in which he asserted his
own strong preference for a life in which the “keynote” is “hope” rather than
“resignation” (p. 414). (As in his earlier addresses, he made it clear that the
prevalence of “hope” over “resignation” does not depend upon any
demonstrable truth about the ultimate character of the universe, since such truth
lies outside our human ken; rather, it depends upon one’s temperamental
inclination as well as one’s will to believe.) Though James did not refer to him
in this context, Schopenhauer’s presence is clearly signaled in James’s use of
“resignation,” which was widely known to be Schopenhauer’s recommendation
regarding the appropriate attitude to show in the face of reality.
(Schopenhauer’s recommendation was accepted explicitly by many, including
Sigmund Freud.) For James, uncertainty about the ultimate nature of the
universe and the efficacy of individual effort was sufficient to allow him to
respond to what “feels like a real fight” and real “possibilities” (James,
1895/1897b, p. 55) by asserting his willingness to live on the “chance” that
fighting back, resisting the pressures of the world, and being strenuous in
standing up for one’s own preferences could make a difference in the world
(James, 1902/1985, p. 414).
Much more could be said – for example, about Schopenhauer as the
inspiration of James’s understanding of the problem of being, as a stimulant of
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his treatment of perception, as a possible source of his beloved concept of the
“sting” of certain precious moments of experience, as an interlocutor regarding
immortality, and so forth. But it is time to end. In doing so, I want to be clear:
More research is needed before it can be said, without qualification, that
Schopenhauer was a major influence on James, but on the basis of what has
been disclosed in this article and noted in this appendix, it seems reasonable to
conjecture that Schopenhauer was in fact among the more significant figures in
James’s life and work. At minimum, even without further study, it can be said
that Schopenhauer was instrumental at an important moment in James’s life and
that he remained on the edges of James’s consciousness, prodding and
provoking, throughout his career.
It will be interesting to see how the connection between Schopenhauer and
James will come to be understood if and as other scholars subject it to closer
inspection.
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NOTES
1

This passage, which appears on pp. 134-135, is attributed in the text to a
French correspondent, whose communication James has allegedly translated
“freely” into English. It is now universally accepted, given James’s own
admission to the translator of Varieties into French (!), that the communication
was in fact a report of his own case – of his “acute neurasthenic attack with
phobia,” as he called it – whose “provenance,” he said, he had “naturally

William James Studies: Vol. 11

	
  

NEW INSIGHTS: PART I

21

	
  
disguised” (from a letter reproduced in an appendix to James, 1902/1985, p.
508).
2
I am personally satisfied with “generally truthful” as a description of
James’s account of his personal crisis. Still, I am going to argue that James’s
account is likely to have been less “a composite composition” than Croce (2009,
p. 57) had reason to suggest, without knowledge of the discoveries I will
discuss. And I can see no reason or evidence that bars me from imagining, at
least, that James, fluent enough in French, may actually have written an initial
account of his crisis in French, and that he might have translated that account
later into English, as he claimed to have done in Varieties (James, 1902/1985, p.
134). If a written account, either in French or English, still existed when James
died, it could have been destroyed by his widow or eldest son, Henry James III,
who burned many personal letters and papers in the years after his death. Of
course, if James had written an account at the time of the incident, he would
almost certainly have done so in his private diary – the same diary from which
entries between April 30, 1870, and February 10, 1873, have been removed
(James, 1868-1873). In fact, given everything else that he was writing down in
this diary between 1868 and 1873, including comments on his suicidal
inclinations, it would be surprising if he hadn’t written a report in his diary.
And if he did so, mightn’t he have done so in French, perhaps to disguise its
“provenance” in case someone – a parent? – happened to open his diary?
Though not typical, there was a precedent for his writing a personal entry in
French, surrounded by quotation marks, as if he had copied it from some French
clinical source: On July 22, 1868, he wrote what Richardson has called “a
conversation with himself” in French, which began (as translated) “So – you
want to die?” (James, 1868-1873, discussed by Richardson, 2006, p. 93).
Clearly, both instances (this passage and a possible later report of his
hallucinatory experience) involved deeply troubling personal incidents in
James’s life. If James did write a diary account of his frightful experience, one
could wonder if it was James himself who later tore it out…and whether he did
so to share it with Alice Howe Gibbens, when he determined that she should
know everything about him before deciding upon his fitness as a potential
husband, as illustrated by his sharing of two entries written in his “memorandum
pad” during what he identified to her as his “pessimistic crisis” in the earlier
1870s (James, 1877/1995g, p. 572). Or, less dramatically, he could have ripped
it out in order to use it in writing Varieties. These are all things that I can
imagine, as I say. While I cannot and will not argue for any of these
possibilities, they are nonetheless consistent with what is known at the present
time.
3
Menand (2001) suggests that “there was no philosopher (Schopenhauer
was a possible exception) for whom James felt a deeper loathing than Hegel” (p.
358), and Richardson (2006) notes that James “came to loathe Schopenhauer’s
pessimism” (p. 14). It’s easy to see how they came to these conclusions, but I
would suggest that the loathing had more to do with attitude than substance
(granting that attitude overlapped with substance for James), and that it obscures
an underlying respect. The ultimate source of Menand’s comment may be the
passage in The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902/1985) in which James
belittled Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, despite their sometimes “ennobling
sadness,” for their othertimes “peevishness” that comes across like “the sick
shriekings of two dying rats” (p. 39). Richardson’s conclusion is related to a
negative comment made when James refused to serve on a committee working
toward the construction of a statue in honor of Schopenhauer – a comment from
the same letter that Perry quoted at length. But James’s deep respect for
Schopenhauer is also apparent in this letter, though underplayed in his typically
playful manner. Noting that “I really must decline to stir a finger for the glory
of one who studiously lived for no other purpose than to spit upon the lives of
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the like of me” (a statement that is directly relevant to the analysis that follows
in this article), James wrote that “if there be any kernel of truth in
Schopenhauer’s system, (and it seems to me there is a deep one) it ought to be
celebrated in silence and in secret, by the inner lives of those to whom it speaks”
since “taking some things seriously is incompatible with ‘celebrating’ them”
(James, 1883/1997b, p. 456). Despite this hint of a more positive view of
Schopenhauer, no biographer or scholar has attended to James’s relationship
with this important philosopher. Not even Feinstein (1984), who focused so
closely on the details of James’s early development (extending into the 1870s),
picked up on the hints elaborated upon in this article.
4
I am focusing in this paragraph, as was Perry, on the period between 1858
and 1877. There is a good amount of evidence about later contact between
James’s thought and Schopenhauer’s, some of which will be reviewed in the
appendix to this article. And, of course, there is more evidence now about
James’s contact with Schopenhauer before 1875, as I will discuss in what
follows.
5
There are now good English translations of the works that I have
mentioned: Schopenhauer (1841/2009, 1851/1974, 1859/1966, & 1864/2012).
James purchased and signed his own copy of Schopenhauer’s two-volume Die
Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (3d ed., 1859) in Paris in early November 1868.
Both volumes, annotated by James, are in Houghton Library at Harvard
University. Although he read an earlier (1841) edition of Die beiden
Grundprobleme der Ethik in 1870, at some subsequent date (1881 or later) he
purchased and annotated an (1881) edition that was sold in 1923, according to a
list of “William James’s Sources” composed by Ralph Barton Perry and
deposited in Harvard’s Houghton Library, catalogued as MS Am 1092.9 (4578).
There is also good reason to suppose that James discussed Schopenhauer’s ideas
with Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the late 1860s. See Holmes (1923/1964, p.
215) for confirmation of his familiarity with Schopenhauer, which almost
certainly stemmed from this period (see Howe, 1957, p. 260). And he probably
saw and read various articles on Schopenhauer, including three English
translations that appeared in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy
(Schopenhauer, 1867a, 1867b, & 1871). His primary reading of Schopenhauer’s
works, however, was in the original German.
6
It is relevant to note that James’s dual (physical and moral) collapse
occurred, by his own reckoning, around the time that, in fact, he checked a book
by Schopenhauer out of the Harvard College Library, though the argument in
this article doesn’t depend upon this possible conjunction, largely because of
James’s propensity for backsliding – for making some progress and then falling
back into physical and mental doldrums.
The forward-and-backward,
sometimes zigzagging nature of James’s development during this period is
illustrated by James’s on-and-off acceptance of the conscious automaton theory,
as I’ve discussed elsewhere (Leary, 2013) at considerable length. It is also
illustrated by the various times at which he seems to have accepted Charles
Renouvier’s argument for free will, only to lapse in that acceptance and have to
accept it all over again. (This point is related to but not exactly the same as the
point made in Note #9.) The issues surrounding James’s vacillating views on
the conscious automaton theory and free will go hand-in-hand with his broader
wresting with “the moral business,” as discussed below.
7
I won’t rehearse all of the issues associated with James’s crisis since
Croce (2009) has already discussed most of them. I do want to note, however,
that among the possible issues (according to Sander L. Gilman, Kim Townsend,
and Donald Capps) are guilt and fear prompted by James’s reading of the
medical literature on “sexual abuse” and “insane masturbators” (see Croce,
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2009, pp. 43, 44, & 49). I agree with Croce’s conclusion that “there is very little
evidence to support this reading of the crisis” (p. 45). In addition, Capps’
association of “auto-eroticism” with James’s mention of his “moral degradation”
(touched upon by Croce, 2009, p. 49) seems to me to misconstrue the
significance that “the moral business” had for James, as seen throughout his
earlier and later letters as well as many entries in his diary.
8
Even at the age of 16, James felt that “everyone’s object in life” should be
“to be as much use as possible” and that “the best way to serve God is to serve
your fellow men.” After all, he asked, “which of us would wish to go through
life without leaving a trace behind to mark his passage”? This foreshadowed his
later concern about “the moral business” in which “every man can do as much as
is in his power and having done so will have fulfilled his mission. We must all
lead an active life and live for others, not for ourselves….We must try to bring
about that happy time when everyone will have enough for him self [sic]
materially, and will work for the common good” (James, 1858/1995a, pp. 1113). Ten years later, despite many vicissitudes in other regards, he still held the
same opinion: “The thought that with me outlasts all others…is the thought of
my having a will, and of my belonging to a brotherhood of men….And if we
have to give up all hope of seeing into the purposes of God…we can by our will
make the enjoyment of our brothers stand us in the stead of a final cause
and…lead a life so active, and so sustained by a clean-conscience as not to need
to fret much….Contribute your mite in any way to the mass of work wh. each
generation subtracts fm. the task of the next, and you will come in to real
relations with your brothers….Every thing [sic] we know & are is through men.
We have no revelation but through man” (James, 1868/1995b, pp. 248-250).
For all his wavering about whether or not he had a free will and thereby could
fulfill his deepest hope, James never wavered regarding the nature of “the moral
business” that would make his life meaningful. Even when he was “swamped in
an empirical philosophy” that made him “feel that we are Nature through and
through, that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens
save as the result of physical laws,” he held out hope that “we are [also,
somehow] en rapport with reason.” But “how to conceive it? who knows?”
(James, 1869/1995c, pp. 370-371). Richardson (2006) nicely summarizes what
James meant by “the moral business,” namely, “that, after all, we are able to will
and to choose our path in life, that we are not powerless pawns in an alldetermined universe. It is not what fate does to us that matters; what matters is
what we do with what fate does to us” (p. 111). To James, the great question
was whether or not we do, indeed, live in “a moral universe” in which our
efforts make a difference. Later in life he related his conviction that we do live
in such a universe to a virtual poly- or even pantheism that held humans
responsible for assisting in the creation of a more ideal world. (See the
appendix to this article.)
9
This is illustrated best, perhaps, by the fact that James had to return to
Renouvier’s text for periodic booster shots. After one of these shots – two and a
half years after he reported the positive effect of Renouvier’s essay in late April
1870 – he wrote to Renouvier himself to inform him that he was just then
“beginning to experience a rebirth of the moral life” due to the influence of his
philosophy (James, 1872/1995e, p. 430; trans. in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, p. 662).
And this incipient rebirth took place a full five months before his father reported
that James was just then showing a vast improvement based partly on his
reading of Renouvier (quoted in Perry, 1935, Vol. 1, pp. 339-340), an
improvement that will be mentioned later in this article. Clearly, recovery from
depression, anxiety, physical exhaustion, and other problems is always likely to
be a slow and uneven process. I mention all of this simply to caution against
any simplistic view that James was converted and transformed once and for all
by his reading of Renouvier’s text in April 1870.
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A rapid rise in Western knowledge about Eastern thought, fueled by
scholarship as well as translations of ancient texts, was a widespread
phenomenon throughout the nineteenth century. Although Schopenhauer
reached the basic conclusions of his philosophy in the early decades of the
century before he encountered Hinduism and Buddhism, he soon realized that
their affinity with his own ideas, coupled with their ancient origins and
multitude of adherents, made them a boon to his own purposes. He not only
became an advocate of Eastern wisdom but also adopted its moral principles (in
particular, its fundamental principle of sympathy and compassion for all living
creatures). On these topics, see Cartwright (2010), Droit (2003), and Magee
(1997b). Here are some representative statements by Schopenhauer, which
James would have read prior to his personal crisis and which are relevant to
points I will be making. First, from Parerga and Paralipomena (1851/1974;
loosely translated as “Additions and Omissions”), which James, like most
readers outside the German-speaking world, encountered first among
Schopenhauer’s publications (in its German version, of course, not in its later
English translation): “The readers of my Ethics know that with me the
foundation of morality rests ultimately on the truth that has its expression in the
Veda and Vedanta in the established mystical formula tat tvam asi (This art
thou) which is stated with reference to every living thing, whether man or
animal, and is then called the Mahavakya or Great Word” (Vol. 2, p. 219). Note
that this English translation, like all English renderings of this saying (other than
James’s!), transliterates the German w (in twam) into the English v (in tvam) to
preserve the same sound. This will be relevant to my argument. “With the
Hindus and Buddhists…the Mahavakya (the great word) ‘tat tvam asi’ (this art
thou) applies and is always to be expressed over every animal in order that we
may have before us, as a guide to our conduct, the identity of his inner nature
and ours” (p. 373). And now from a later English translation of the third edition
of The World as Will and Representation (1859/1966), the edition that James
purchased and read in German: “Plurality in general is necessarily conditioned
by time and space, and only in these is conceivable, and in this respect we call
them the principium individuationis….This thing-in-itself [the underlying nature
of all, namely, the will, according to Schopenhauer]…lies outside time and
space, and accordingly knows no plurality, and consequently is one” (Vol. 1, pp.
127-128). “If we had to convey to the beholder, for reflection and in a word, the
explanation and information about their inner nature, it would be best for us to
use the Sanskrit formula which occurs so often in the sacred books of the
Hindus, and is called Mahavakya, i.e., the great word: ‘Tat tvam asi,’ which
means “This living thing are thou’” (p. 220). “Historical philosophy,”
concerned with things in time, “stops at what Kant calls the phenomenon in
opposition to the thing-in-itself, and what Plato calls the becoming…in
opposition to the being…, or finally what is called by the Indians the web of
Maya” (p. 274). “Birth and death belong only to the phenomenon of the will,
and hence to life….Birth and death belong equally to life….The wisest of all
mythologies, the Indian, expresses this by giving to the very god who
symbolizes destruction and death…the lingam, that symbol of generation….In
this way, it is intimated that generation and death…reciprocally neutralize and
eliminate each other” (pp. 275-276). “The individual is only the phenomenon,
not the thing-in-itself….As soon as we enter into ourselves…and wish for once
to know ourselves fully by directing our knowledge inwards, we lose ourselves
in the bottomless void; we find ourselves like a hollow glass globe, from the
emptiness of which a voice speaks” (p. 278). “The life of every individual,
viewed as a whole and in general,…is really a tragedy” (p. 322). “The Maya of
the Indians, the work and fabric of which are the whole world of illusions, is
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paraphrased by amor” in that love-making produces what seem to be
ontologically distinct individuals (p. 330). “The eyes of the uncultured
individual are clouded, as the Indians say, by the veil of Maya….He sees not the
inner nature of things, which is one, but its phenomena as separated, detached,
innumerable, very different, and indeed opposed” (p. 352). “We find the direct
presentation in the Vedas, the fruit of the highest human knowledge and
wisdom, the kernel of which has finally come to us in the Upanishads as the
greatest gift to the nineteenth century. It is expressed in various ways, but
especially by the fact that all beings of the world, living and lifeless,” have
“pronounced” over them, “tat tvam asi, which means ‘This art thou’” (p. 355).
“The veil of Maya envelops the mind” so that an individual “regards his person
as absolutely different from every other” and “adheres with all his might” to this
illusion “since it alone suits and supports his egoism” (p. 365). “Whoever is still
involved in the principium individuationis, in egoism, knows only particular
things and their relation to his person” (p. 378). These quotations, all taken
from the first volume of Schopenhauer’s World as Will and Representation (the
first edition of which appeared in 1818, though dated 1819), should suffice as
background evidence supporting the claims I will make. The second volume,
first published in 1844, is composed of supplementary elaborations and
commentaries on the sections of the first edition.
11
In directly addressing Minny in his diary, James was doing something
that was unprecedented in earlier entries and unparalleled in later ones. But
then, in addressing her in his Schopenhauerian frame of mind, he was actually
addressing himself as – consistent with the argument in this article – he had
dropped the veil that separated him and her and had come to realize his
fundamental identification with her. He graphically represented this moment in
his life by drawing a tombstone in his diary with the inscription “March 9 / M+T
/ 1870.” Note that Minny Temple died on March 8. March 9 was the date on
which James learned about Minny’s death, and died along with her.
12
This is a good place to address a very reasonable question that might be
in the reader’s mind. Weren’t the transcendentalists – and Ralph Waldo
Emerson, in particular – interested in Eastern thought? Didn’t they advance
translations of the sacred documents of the East, and didn’t Emerson himself
publish essays on “Spiritual Laws” (1841/1903a), “The Over-Soul”
(1841/1903b), and “Illusions” (1860/1903c) as well as a poem on “Brahma”
(1867/1903d) that convey fundamental insights of Eastern thought? Couldn’t
these writings, with which James was familiar, have been the source of his
thinking during his period of crisis? That’s a sensible conjecture, but in fact the
first two essays, appearances aside, were drawn primarily from Emerson’s
immersion in Neoplatonic thought, and none of Emerson’s writings includes a
reference to the Sanskrit Tat twam (or tvam) asi. Meanwhile, the strongest
evidence that James’s use of Tat twam asi and its related cluster of ideas came
from Schopenhauer rather than Emerson (or any other transcendentalist) is that
single letter – the ‘w’ in twam – in James’s spelling of that word each time he
cites it. This indicates that James was quoting a German source (see Note #10),
and hence Schopenhauer, since no other German source with which he was
familiar included the same cluster of terms and ideas. James’s interest in
Buddhism was clearly piqued, however, and in the latter half of 1870 he read
parts, at least, of Alabaster’s The Modern Buddhist (1870), the first volume of
Köppen’s Religion des Buddha (1857), and Taine’s “Le Boudhissme” (1865),
followed by Bastian’s Die Weltauffassung der Buddhisten (1870) in early 1871.
He also read Sen’s Brahmo Somaj (1870) in late 1870, though this work treated
a newly Christianized form of Hinduism. (All these texts are listed in James,
1868-1873; Köppen’s was checked out of Harvard College Library on
September 13, 1870.) Interestingly, James didn’t mention any of this reading in
his extant letters and manuscript notes. More significantly, he had cited Tat
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twam asi in his diary on March 22, 1870, well before reading these other books,
which eliminates them as potential sources of his knowledge of that Sanskrit
phrase. Finally, his reading of Taine’s article, with its more positive spin on
“the cult of nothingness,” might have started James thinking in a less negative
light about Hindu and Buddhist views. See Droit (2003, especially pp. 133148), which includes a discussion of Nietzsche’s contemporaneous reaction to
Buddhism. Droit begins his book discussing the widespread Western reaction
against Buddhism in the middle of the nineteenth century, a reaction that
depicted Buddhism as “a paradoxical and horrible religion of nothingness,” thus
reinforcing the then-common belief that Eastern thought is inherently negative
or pessimistic (pp. 4-5). He doesn’t mention James but James’s initial reaction
fits within the pattern he describes. Droit’s book is devoted to “an analysis of
this error” (p. 5).
13
It is relevant to note that, so far as letters, diary entries, and library
records indicate, James followed through on his intention not to read
Schopenhauer’s books for some time, thus confirming (to the extent that a
negative can imply a positive) that it was Schopenhauer to whom he was
referring.
14
It might seem strange that James was relieved to think that mental
disorder didn’t require a physical basis – that it could also be due to
circumstantial and psychological causes – but the flip side was that one could do
something, potentially, about circumstances and psychological phenomena (like
misperceptions and phobias) whereas James’s great fear was that physical
causes could not be thwarted in the same way. In fact, before the conversion
reported to his father, he had worried that the James family had some congenital
weakness (“s’thing in the blood”) that predisposed them to mental and physical
troubles, which had led him to swear off marriage for himself and to counsel his
brother Robertson to avoid marriage as well (James, 1869/1995d). Note that
James’s personal crisis revolved around the fear that if nature so decided – if
physical processes just happened to work out that way – he would be reduced to
the same imbecilic state as the poor epileptic patient he had seen in an asylum.
As regards Schopenhauer’s views, although he admitted that mental disorder
could result from “external, objective occasions” such as unrequited love and the
strains of war, he argued that “madness…depends more often on purely somatic
causes” (Schopenhauer, 1859/1966, Vol. 2, p. 401). As for Wordsworth, the
chief work that James had been reading was Wordsworth’s long narrative poem
“The Excursion” (1814/1977), which argues, in essence, that nature is the
product of both mind and matter – that the mind is not a passive recipient of
matter’s causal pressures, but rather, that it actively confers order, meaning, and
value to matter. This was a message that James needed. Especially the poem’s
fourth book on “Despondency Corrected” provided “authentic tidings” of “the
mind’s excursive power” (pp. 154-155; James, 1874/1995f, p. 488).
Wordsworth himself foresaw the effect of his poem: “To enfeebled Power, /
From this communion with uninjured Minds, / What renovation had been
brought; and what / Degree of healing to a wounded spirit” (p. 289).
15
It is worth noting that this dating accords with the best estimate of
James’s son, Henry James III, which was accepted by John E. Smith in his
introduction to the definitive edition of James’s Varieties of Religious
Experience (1902/1985, p. xvii).
16
On January 1, 1870, the first two sets of “works” that James resolved (in
his diary) to finish reading that year were his father’s and Schopenhauer’s
(James, 1868-1873). According to a list in that same diary, he had already read
his father’s Moralism and Christianity (1850) in the months after receiving his
M.D. on June 21, 1869 – in fact, right after he had read Schopenhauer’s chapter
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on “man’s need for metaphysics” (see this article’s appendix on Schopenhauer
and James). Later that year he had read his father’s Lectures and Miscellanies
(1852). Then, the first book he listed in his diary as read in 1870 was his
father’s Nature of Evil (1855). Subsequently in 1870, he read two more of his
father’s works. His father was, of course, a more than subtle presence in
nurturing James’s sensitivity to evil and an indirect influence with regard to
Schopenhauer, by making the collection of the Boston Athenaeum available to
him. In addition, his father’s own personal crisis (his famous “vastation”
experience of 1844) became entangled with James’s recollections of his own
crisis to the extent that he drew attention to it (in a footnote) when he reported
on his own moment of crisis in The Varieties of Religious Experience
1902/1985, p. 135). As for Marcus Aurelius, whom James had read earlier and
to whom he returned from time to time, Harvard’s Houghton Library has the
annotated copy of The Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus (1864),
inscribed by “Wm. James / Boston Feby 1865.” For information on James’s
relation to Aurelius, see Sutton (2009). As regards James’s concern about
scientific determinism, see Leary (2013).
17
Just as I was completing this article, I received from John Kaag a
photocopy of the title page of the first volume of Julius Frauenstädt’s
Schopenhauer-Lexikon: Ein philosophisches Wörterbuch (1871).
This
dictionary of Schopenhauer’s philosophical terms has no annotations in it but
the title page bears the following inscription: “W. E. Hocking / from the library
of William James / May 1923.” This previously unknown possession of James
doesn’t appear in R. B. Perry’s list of volumes sold from James’s library in 1923
after his widow Alice died in 1922 (regarding this list, see Note #5), presumably
because Perry included only volumes that were annotated by James, though it is
also possible that the volume was given rather than sold to Hocking, who taught
at Harvard in the decades following James’s death in 1910. The discovery of
this volume, which underscores James’s interest in Schopenhauer’s work, serves
as yet another reminder of the ephemeral nature of historical evidence and the
resulting gaps in the historical record (a reminder, that is, of something already
illustrated by the discoveries related in this article and its sequel). When James
purchased this volume and how he may have used it cannot now be determined;
but the existence of another bit of Jamesian Schopenhaueriana belies any claims
about his lack of interest in Schopenhauer’s thought. John Kaag found this
volume when he recently stumbled upon the previously unknown library of
(William) Ernest Hocking at the Hocking family’s New Hampshire estate (see
Kaag, 2014). It is relevant to add that among the other books once owned by
James, also found by Kaag in Hocking’s library, were Henry Clarke Warren’s
Buddhism in Translation (1896) and Paul Carus’s Buddhism and Its Christian
Critics (1897). (Warren’s book is included on Perry’s list, mentioned above and
in Note #5; Carus’s is not, though his 1898 Gospel of Buddha is listed there.)
James did annotate these books, and his annotations have allowed Kaag (2012)
to clarify the significance of Buddhism for some of James’s important analyses
and assertions in Varieties and other late-life works. Additional sources that
offer similar clarification (including the results of archival research by David
Scott and Eugene Taylor) are discussed by King (2005).
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